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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON 
BARTON, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
Case No. 991026-CA 
Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
RESPONSE TO Mr. BARTON'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Mr. Barton asserts, as did Mrs. Barton, that contempt matters are viewed for abuse 
of discretion. Mr. Barton appears to go further, however, and would apply that "abuse of 
discretion" standard of review to all rulings of the trial court, including legal rulings. If that 
is Mr. Barton's argument, it misstates the law. Legal rulings are always reviewed for 
correctness. If a court exercises its discretion based on a mistaken understanding of the law, 
the court has abused its discretion. " [T]he party adversely affected thereby is entitled to have 
the error rectified and a proper adjudication under correct principles of law." Ferris v. 
Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). Accord Gaw v. State. 798 P.2d 1130,1134 (Utah 
1 
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Ct. App. 1990) (cert, denied 3 Jan 1991). Because the trial court here erroneously concluded 
that it had jurisdiction (a legal conclusion), it abused its discretion. 
OBJECTION TO Mr. BARTON'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Barton's Statement of the Case quotes from a transcript of a hearing in California 
(Mr. Barton's brief at 4), and Mr. Barton attached a copy of the transcript to his brief. The 
transcript was not made a part of the record before the trial court, and the reference to it on 
appeal is improper. Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). 
Mrs. Barton moves the Court to strike the transcript and any reference to it. 
In addition, Mrs. Barton established in her statement of facts, with appropriate citation 
to the record, that Mr. Barton had moved to California in 1998. (Mrs. Barton's brief at 5.) 
Mr. Barton makes a contrary argument in his brief (Mr. Barton's brief pp. 5, 8), but provides 
no supporting citation to the record. This Court should disregard Mr. Barton's unsupported 
claim that he maintained residency in Utah.1 
l]n any event, if Mr. Barton disputed that his residence was in California, that dispute 
should have been resolved by the trial court and appropriate findings made. (Mrs. Barton's 
brief at 13.) 
2 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
vtlLACKt itlSDK 
A. The Special Master Had Been Established. 
There was no dispute in this case 'that a "Special Master" had been designated in 
California, and both Mr. Barton and Mrs. Barton had consul ka ^wii UK .^ pewiai Master. Not 
surprisingly iihhi IIJL»II ilk" (ur<it:\ vm h i niKiillul \\\\\\ lli i special MasJri r;u:li \\ iiitx wanted 
the Special Master to act in accordance with the desires of that part} Mr. Barton wanted the 
Special Mastei to immediateh oidei visitation desired b} " 1\ lr. Barton Mrs, Barton, lacked 
financial resources to pa;, uu ^pL^.„ .: ^ T 
iiKTtiiigs Willi him I ' *• :ic blailci* a Hi liic idii. ihe Special Master 
agreed to wait. (Transcript Oci "^
 ± ;9 j Mi Barton understandably objected to the delay. 
The trial court misinterpreted the expected tension over implementation nil! tin, Spi, ad 
Master's deciy - • x ! * and 
agreed upon uwmun liw, parties/* Mis. Barton submits that the rudena MK msively 
showed that the Special Master was agreed upon by the parties and therefoi e established. 
isn It Sell ton li.ii! i He 11 111 contrary t.vhlrnu iMnir impi 11 Kinll s bit <msi lb» iv.iiii was 
2Mr. Barton's argument (Mi Barton's Brief p r» ;ha! Mi- Bartoi- "did little to 
cooperate with the Special Master and did little to facilitate Mi *um \ ^ \ isnanon with his 
children" is (a) not supported by citation to the record and (b) evidence of disagreement as 
to the underlying visitation issues but not evi.den.ee of disagreement as to the authority of the 
Special Master, 
3 
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contested, the trial court should have made express findings to support its ruling on the issue. 
Romrell v. Zions First National Bank N.A.. 611 P.2d 392, 394-95 (Utah 1980). The failure 
to make the required findings is reversible error. Id. 
B, The PKPA Precluded Utah From Exercising Jurisdiction. 
Mr. Barton's only defense to Mrs. Barton's argument that the PKPA barred Utah's 
exercise of jurisdiction is the assertion that Mr. Barton remained a resident of Utah. As 
shown in the preceding point, the record does not support that claim. 
Here the evidence showed that all parties were residing in California. Utah had lost 
jurisdiction, both under the PKPA and under the clear terms of the decree itself. The trial 
court erred in exercising jurisdiction. 
C. Deferrence to California's Jurisdiction was Required. 
Mrs. Barton's brief argued that jurisdiction should have been in California because 
both parties and children were in California, the family support was in California, and the 
decree itself provided that jurisdiction should shift to California. Mr. Barton did not 
specifically respond to this argument, and should be deemed to have agreed with Mrs. 
Barton's position. 
The argument is particularly persuasive in this case, where Mrs. Barton's only real 
"contempt" was failing to personally appear in court to argue the lack of jurisdiction. 
Although the Utah trial court also purported to rely on Mrs. Barton's claimed visitation 
violation, the court held it didn't have jurisdiction to rule on the visitation issues. 
4 
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POINTH 
MR. BARTON'S CLAIM OF BAD FAITH 
NECESSITATED, AND DID NOT BAR, 
MRS. BARTON'S EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH. 
Point II of Mrs. Barton's brief shows that the trial court improperly excluded evidence 
of justification for her actions. As support for her claim that the evidence was not hearsay, 
Mrs. Barton cited State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333 (Utah 1980). Mr. Barton now points out 
that Sorensen also states that "hearsay" evidence is admissible "if it is offered to support a 
defense of good faith." Id. 337. Mr. Barton then argues that Mrs. Barton's supposed bad 
faith precluded her attempt to show good faith. 
Mr. Barton's arguement makes no sense. He apparently asserts that just because there 
was evidence which, if unrebutted, might support a finding of bad faith, Mrs. Barton was 
precluded from rebutting that evidence. While the trial court might have legitimately chosen 
to rule in favor of Mr. Barton after hearing all the evidence, that certainly did not provide 
justification for excluding that evidence prior to ruling. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO 
CONSIDER WHETHER MRS. BARTON HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY 
THE REIMBURSEMENT ASSESSED AGAINST HER. 
Mr. Barton's argument highlights the trial court's refusal to permit Mrs. Barton to 
present necessary evidence. As noted on Page 12 of Mr. Barton's brief, the trial court had 
5 
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made up his mind concerning the disposition of this case, and refused to allow Mrs. Barton 
to present evidence of her financial condition. As explained in Mrs. Barton's opening brief, 
however, evidence of her ability to pay was relevant both to the initial finding of contempt 
and to the propriety of sanctions against her. It was error for the trial court to exclude this 
evidence prior to ruling. 
At the very least, findings on the issue of ability to pay should have been made. 
Without those findings, it is impossible for this Court to determine whether there was 
evidence to support the trial court's conclusions. The case should be remanded with 
instructions to specifically find whether Mrs. Barton had the ability to comply with the trial 
court's orders. 
POINT IV 
THIS APPEAL IS NOT IN BAD FAITH; 
MR. BARTON'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
SHOULD BE DENIED. 
Mr. Barton seeks attorney fees under Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which applies to frivolous appeals. As noted in Mr. Barton's own brief, however, 
such sanctions should be awarded only where an appeal is obviously without merit, and then 
only in egregious cases. Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App.1988). 
This is not a frivolous appeal. The arguments are supported by citation to the record 
and to relevant legal authority. Delay is not the motivation for this appeal. Mrs. Barton 
gains nothing from delay, because interest continues to accrue on the judgment against her. 
Even if this Court were to reject Mrs. Barton's arguments, an award of attorney fees for a 
6 
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bad faith appeal would be improper. Mr. Barton's request for attorney fees should be 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under both the decree and the federal 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. If jurisdiction depended on the trial court's resolution 
of factual issues, the court should have made explicit findings. Finally, Mrs. Barton was 
prejudiced by the failure to allow her to present evidence justifying her actions. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Alternatively, the matter should be remanded for findings on Mr. Barton's 
residence and on whether the Special Master had been "established" in California. In the 
event it is determined that the court had subject matter jurisdiction, Mrs. Barton is entitled 
to a new trial at which she can present justification evidence. 
This appeal is made in good faith and is supported by the law and evidence, so Mr. 
Barton's request for attorney fees should be denied. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 2000. 
DON R. PETERSEN and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Rhonda Barton 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this 28th day of August, 2000. 
Dana D. Burrows, Esq. 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
